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The present paper focuses on the analysis of growth sources in Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland explaining the differences in economic performance between these three 
countries which constitute the “cohesion group” in the EU. During the nineties, Ireland 
has made a remarkable economic recovery, converging rapidly to the richest countries 
of the EU, while Portugal converged at a very modest rate. Greece is a peculiar example 
of having great difficulties of adaptation at the early years of its integration and only 
recently (since 1999) revealed signs of recovery in contrast to the slowdown of 
economic activity in Portugal. This raises the questions why was Ireland able to grow 
faster, which were the causes of its faster growth, and what can Portugal learn from the 
Irish success in economic improvement and the recent recovery of the Greek economy. 
This paper tries to shed light to these questions and to identify the main sources which 
drove economic growth in the three countries. Our evidence shows that differences in 
productivity levels, capital accumulation in human resources and technology, foreign 
direct investment and most of all export capacity are the main factors explaining 
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1. Introduction 
 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland are the countries within the European Union, all receiving 
structural assistance from the community as members of the “cohesion group”. 
However, during the nineties, Ireland has shown a remarkable economic recovery, 
converging rapidly to the richest countries of the EU. Greece has grown at higher rates 
only in the late nineties and in 2003 per capita income in Greece exceeded the 
Portuguese one. On the other hand, Portugal grew at very moderate rates in the late 
nineties and with negative records in 2002-2003, diverging from its partners in terms of 
per capita income and productivity standards. This raises some important questions: 
why was Ireland able to grow faster, and Greece to a lesser extent? Which were the 
causes of the faster growth in Ireland and Greece in recent years? What can Portugal 
learn from the Irish and Greek experience in improving economic performance? This 
paper tries to shed light to these questions through a theoretical, an empirical and 
descriptive framework trying to identify the similarities and differences which can 
explain growth performance in the three countries.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to identify the driving 
forces of economic growth in Portugal, Greece and Ireland; secondly, to explain the 
remarkable recovery of the Irish economy, especially in the nineties, the reasonable 
economic performance of Greece in the late nineties and the modest or negative 
performance of Portugal in recent years; and thirdly, to show the lessons that Portugal 
can derive from that positive experience in Ireland and Greece.  
The sources of growth can be identified by a decomposition approach of the 
growth of per capita income. As the evidence shows, the most important contribution 
comes from productivity growth which is much more higher in Ireland and Greece 
relatively to Portugal. The remarkable Irish economic recovery can be explained by 
higher accumulation of technological and human capital and not physical capital as 
happens with Portugal and Greece.  From the analysis of the export-led growth 
approach becomes clearer the superiority of Ireland in terms of export competitiveness. 
It is shown that Ireland has more advantages to grow faster without facing any demand 
constrains, due to lower import penetration and higher export growth. Greece and 
Portugal are not in such a comfortable position and can face problems in the balance of 
payments in the near future that can constrain growth. It is also shown that the influence 
of the EU is stronger in Portugal than in Greece in terms of per capita income and   3
productivity. On the other hand Ireland absorbs better the productivity gains steaming 
from the EU. 
The proposed paper is organised as follows: The next section provides some 
historical statistics on the main indicators which characterise economic growth, trying 
to identify some common tendencies or differences that can explain the growth patterns 
in the three countries. Section 3, through a decomposition analysis of the growth of per 
capita income, tries to identify the main sources which drove economic growth in the 
three countries. Section 4 explores an export-led model that stresses the role of trade as 
the engine of economic growth, focusing on the importance of the Balance-of-Payments 
constraint on growth. Section 5 tests the direct influence of the EU as a whole on each 
individual country’s per capita income and productivity, attempting to find some strong 
links among them. The last section summarises the main findings. 
 
 
2. Economic performance in Portugal,  Greece  and  Ireland:  differences  and                             
similarities. 
  
At the beginning of the sixties the three countries had a lot in common. They were 
small, poor and closed economies, with high levels of emigration and trade protection 
policies. Their economic structures were similar, characterised by a high share of 
agriculture in output and employment. Since the sixties the agricultural share has been 
declining in the three countries but different sectors have risen in its place. The shift of 
resources to the industrial sector is more intensive in Ireland than in Portugal and 
Greece. The share of manufacturing in GDP grew faster in Ireland while in the other 
two countries the share of services gained more importance. Evidence from recent years 
shows that the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP is still higher in Ireland, 
around 40%, while in Greece and Portugal industrial share is less than 30%. On the 
other hand, the industrial share in employment is lower in Ireland indicating higher 
levels of productivity.    
Living standards, measured by GDP per head, and productivity levels measured 
by GDP per worker, were significantly below the European average when they joined 
the Community (Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981 and Portugal in 1986). But Irish higher 
economic performance in the nineties changed this backward position as can be seen 
below, in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
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TABLE 1 – GDP PER CAPITA AS PERCENTAGE OF THE EU-15 AVERAGE  
 
    1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2001 
Portugal 25.2 56.5 62.1 67.1 68.3 68.9 
Greece 32.5  73.7 81.6 65.9 63.9 62.7 
Ireland 59.4  67.0 71.5 78.8 90.4 118.8 
           Note: GDP per capita in PPP terms 
           Source: OECD Statistical Compendium, 2003  
 
 






























    
In 2001, Irish per capita income was 19% higher than the EU average but Portuguese 
and Greek per capita incomes corresponded to only 68.9 and 62.7% of the EU average, 
respectively. The Greek economy shows a different path, a higher capacity of catching-
up in the pre accession period (before 1980) but a reverse tendency afterwards. The 
Portuguese economy reveals a better adaptation during the post accession period. In 
terms of GDP per worker (as proxy for labour productivity) Ireland is the country that 
has been closer to the European Union average. The improvement of Irish productivity 
was substantial, to the extent that, in 1990, the Irish GDP per worker exceeded the EU-
15 average. The same happened with respect to GDP per head in 1999, according to 
OECD statistics. By the end of the nineties the Irish leaving standards were clearly 
above the European Union average. Greece also has shown higher productivity levels 
Source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, 2003   5
than Portugal, but the pattern was unstable. Once more, the achievements in 
productivity levels were higher in the pre accession period. As we can see from Tables 1 
and 2, Greece was closer to the European Union standards in GDP per capita and per 
worker in the beginning of the eighties than it was in the nineties. In Portugal we find 
evidence of catching-up both in terms of living standards and output per worker but the 
improvement is very slow. 
 
TABLE 2 – GDP PER WORKER AS PERCENTAGE OF THE EU-15 AVERAGE 
 
    1970 1980 1990 1995 2001 
Portugal 56.9 60.3 59.8 64.2 63.2
Greece 66.4  93.8 76.5 73.1 80.1
Ireland 73.6  84.3 101.2 106.1 119.6
  































From the sixties to nineties, growth performance reveals substantial differences in the 
three countries. The average growth rate of Irish GDP per capita was higher in the 90’s 
in contrast to Portugal and Greece where it was higher during the sixties, the decade of 
higher growth in all Europe. Greece reveals again a higher growth capacity since 1999, 
in a way that Greek per capita income exceeded once more the Portuguese one in 2003. 
Source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, 2003  6
The composition of GDP has changed since the 60’s, when the contribution of exports 
was less than 20% in Portugal and Ireland and less than 10% in Greece. This change 
was due to a new international openness of these economies. By the end of the nineties 
the share of exports in the Irish economy was close to 95%, but in Portugal it was only 
34% and in Greece even less, with a contribution to GDP of only 22%. Foreign trade 
has always been unbalanced in the three countries due to import penetration being 
higher than exports. But since the mid -80’s, the Irish foreign trade position has changed 
radically, showing a significant surplus. In Portugal and Greece the deficits persisted 
over time. By the end of the nineties the Irish trade surplus of goods and services was 
nearly 15% of GDP. On the other hand, Portugal and Greece registered deficits 
corresponding to about 10% of GDP.  
Looking at the GDP decomposition according to the expenditure approach, it is 
interesting to note that the Irish Gross Fixed Capital Formation share (20% in 2001) has 
always been lower than that recorded in Greece (23%) and Portugal (28%). The 
evidence shows that Ireland invested more in human and technological capital than in 
physical capital formation. As members of the less developed countries within the 
European Community, Portugal, Greece and Ireland benefited from structural 
assistance. The allocation of structural funds received was different in each country. 
Portugal and Greece allocated these funds, essentially, to improve infrastructures, while 
Ireland’s main application was on the improvement of human capital qualifications and 
the development of technical progress.  
  
3. Sources of economic growth in the three countries 
 
A simple way to identify the sources of economic growth in different countries is by 
splitting up the series of per capita output into different components. Using available 
data, GDP per head can be analysed as the product of four terms: GDP per worker as 
proxy for labour productivity; employment rate obtained by the ratio of employment to 
total labour force; participation rate as the ratio of labour force to population of working 
age; and the dependency ratio obtained by dividing working age population by total 
population, as it is shown below: 
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The growth rate of GDP per head is therefore the sum of the growth of these four 
components. Figures 3 to 5 illustrate this breakdown of the series for each country over 
the whole period 1970-2000 and some sub periods. It is clear that the contribution of 
productivity growth has been the most important factor explaining the output per head 
growth in the three countries over the total period 1970-2000, and also in each sub-
period. It can also be seen that in Portugal and Greece productivity grew faster during 
the seventies while in Ireland the decade of eighties was the period of the highest 
growth in productivity.  
Considering the whole period (1970-2000) the contribution of employment rate to 
per capita income growth was negative, showing a declining tendency in the three 
countries since the seventies. The contribution of this factor was only positive in the 
seventies for Greece, in the eighties for Portugal and the nineties in the Irish case. 
The participation rate made a positive contribution to growth over the whole 
period (1970-2001) in the three countries. When one looks at the evolution of this rate 
in the three countries it is interesting to see that only the Portuguese participation rate 
was higher than the European Union average, by early seventies. During the nineties all 
the Irish factors made a positive contribution to growth explaining the turnover position 
of Irish economic performance in this decade. The same did not happen with Portugal 
and Greece. The employment rate shows a negative contribution to growth in both 
countries during the nineties, while in Portugal the participation rate also contributed 
negatively to the growth of GDP per head. Ireland had a substantial increase in the 
participation and employment rates and also an improvement in the dependency ratio. 
Although the nineties was the decade of higher growth in GDP per head in Ireland, it 
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Source: OCDE, Statistical Compendium, 2003
Source: OCDE, Statistical Compendium, 2003  9


















Table 3 shows the progression of the gap between each country and the European Union 
average with respect to factors that contribute to growth. The growing Irish advantage in 
labour productivity is very obvious, since the gap has been reduced over time, and in the 
nineties productivity level in Ireland was higher than the European Union average. On 
the other hand, the Portuguese and Greek disadvantage in productivity levels became 
wider over time, and the gap grew continuously since the 70’s. The Portuguese position 
is even worst comparing to Greece, showing a higher distance in productivity 
differences in all decades.  
          With regard to participation rate, Portugal shows a clear advantage over Ireland 
that is even higher with respect to Greece. Portuguese participation rate has always been 
higher than the EU average and the gap increased through time. The main Irish 
disadvantage is on the employment rate, always being below the EU average. The low 
employment rates in Ireland can be the explanation for higher unemployment records in 
this country.  The Portuguese employment rate overcame the EU average and in the 
nineties the gap was even higher. The higher employment rates in Portugal can be the 
explanation for low unemployment but also low productivity levels in this country. For 
Greece the employment rate is also higher than the EU average but the gap has been 
reduced rapidly approximating the EU levels in the late nineties. 
Source: OCDE, Statistical Compendium,  2003  10
TABLE 3 – GAP BETWEEN EACH COUNTRY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION AVERAGE IN THE  
                     FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO GROWTH 
 
Gap (EU15 - PORTUGAL)  1970-79 1980-89 1990-97 
GDP per capita (thousands, PPP)   5.90 6.8 5.7 
Productivity (thousands, PPP)  14.80 18.4 17.6 
Employment Rate (%)  0.79 -1.90 -4.49 
Participation Rate (%)  -3.01 -3.94 -4.51 
Dependency (%)  1.54 1.97 -0.32 
 
Gap (EU15 - GREECE)  1970-79 1980-89 1990-97 
GDP per capita (thousands, PPP)  4.4 5.4 6.5 
Productivity (thousands, PPP)  7.4 10.4 11.9 
Employment Rate (%)  -1.50 -2.59 -0.88 
Participation Rate (%)  9.57 7.30 8.54 
Dependency (%)  -0.26 0.94 -0.41 
 
Gap (EU15 - IRELAND)  1970-79 1980-89 1990-97 
GDP per capita (thousands, PPP)  4.9 5.2 2.2 
Productivity (thousands, PPP)  7.9 5.4 -2.6 
Employment Rate (%)  3.08 5.05 3.61 
Participation Rate (%)  2.95 4.38 5.4 
Dependency (%)  5.46 6.75 3.71 
 
Finally, in all periods GDP per head (in PPP terms)  in Ireland grew faster than in 
Portugal and Greece, resulting to a faster approximation towards the EU levels, 
especially in the nineties. The Greek performance in terms of per capita income is 
disappointing, diverging continuously from the EU average. Portugal, instead, shows 
some signs of slow convergence in the last decade. Ireland has made a remarkable 
recovery in living standards overcoming the EU average in recent years.   
          According to some authors who studied closely the case of Ireland, such as Barry 
(1999), the strong improvement in productivity in Ireland can largely be explained by 
foreign investment in manufacturing in high-tech sectors such as electronics, computers 
and pharmaceuticals. Low profit taxation, a highly-skilled labour force, a flexible labour   11
market, investment facilities provided by the government, English as a native or 
commonly spoken language, are, among others, some of the important factors that 
explain the Irish success in attracting high-tech investment. Foreign investment brought 
new technology and innovation improving indigenous productivity. High-tech 
externalities were spread all over the economy, improving competitiveness, exports and 
thus growth.     
Freitas (2000) pointed out the high quality of input factors (capital and labour) as 
the main advantage of Ireland over Portugal. The evidence shows that Portugal invests 
more in physical capital but less in innovation and R&D. The reasons for the success of 
the Irish economy can be found to the quality of new capital and higher qualifications of 
its labour force. Fuente and Vives (1997) studied the sources of differential growth 
between the Irish economy and those of Spain and Portugal, over the period 1970-1995. 
They concluded that the positive differential favouring the Irish economy was due to a 
higher accumulation of input factors (human and technological capital), a better 
performance of the labour market and a higher degree of fiscal discipline. Higher 
exports may be the explanation for the faster growth of the Irish economy in the 
nineties. 
According to the European Commission (2000) the Irish economy appears as one 
of the most innovative economy in the European Innovation Panel, considering a set of 
qualified indicators, such as the percentage of college degrees obtained in Science and 
Technology, R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, number of patents per thousand 
of inhabitants, and so on.  
As the evidence shows, labour productivity seems to be the main source of growth 
in Portugal, Greece and Ireland, since the seventies. Such productivity growth can be 
explained by a higher accumulation of physical capital in Portugal and Greece. On the 
contrast, higher accumulation of technological capital and human capital are responsible 
for higher productivity growth in Ireland. According to various authors, the higher 
investment in human capital and innovation seems to be the most plausible explanation 
for higher growth rates achieved by the Irish economy during the nineties. 
         In  this  section  the  factors  considered were supply driven. Growth differences 
between the three countries are explained in terms of differences in the growth of factor 
supplies and productivity. The studies mentioned above do not consider that growth can 
be constrained by demand factors, especially external demand. The next section 
considers this hypothesis.      12
4. Export-led growth as the explanation of countries differences in the growth of  
    output.  
     
 
The Keynesian approach to growth stresses the importance of the strength of demand in 
explaining differences in growth rates between countries. According to this theory it is 
demand that drives the expansion of the economic system, and demand that might also 
constrain economic growth. Insufficient effective demand can be the explanation for 
lower growth and higher unemployment. Some authors of the Keynesian tradition 
(Kaldor and Thirlwall among others) argue that foreign demand for national products is 
the most important element of exogenous demand that can constrain growth. Exports 
are the most potent element of demand that generate higher growth through the 
Harrodian foreign trade multiplier. This is the essence of export-led growth models, 
which attribute to exports the role of the engine of growth for various reasons: 
-  Exports are the only autonomous element of demand since is generated outside 
the economy; 
-  Exports are the element of demand with the highest multiplier effect on national 
income and have the highest saving propensity; 
-  Exports among the other elements of demand have the lowest import content; 
-  Exports allow for higher imports (especially capital goods and row materials) 
necessary for further economic development, without incurring Balance of 
Payments crises;  
-  Exports have the important role of relaxing international payments constraints 
on demand and thus on growth; 
-  Technology is transferred through exports and in general, trade is the vehicle for 
faster diffusion of knowledge from frontier to laggard countries through trade-
related R&D spillovers; 
-  Exports induce innovation and higher efficiency; 
-  Exports can increase the supply capacity of the economy; 
-  Exports are responsible for generating higher growth with cumulative 
characteristics. 
According to Kaldor exports can generate a virtuous circle of growth with cumulative 
causation properties. An increase in exports (for any reason) raises industrial output 
since this sector produces mostly tradable goods; productivity will increase through the 
link between productivity growth and industrial output growth (the well-known   13
Verdoorn Law)
1; a fall in production costs and efficient wages will be the next 
consequence improving further export competitiveness; a virtuous circle between 
exports and output growth will start to operate having cumulative characteristics. 
Countries or regions with an initial comparative advantage will grow faster and 
reinforce their competitive position making it difficult for others to compete in the same 
activities.       
         Thilrwall(1979) developed Kaldor´s ideas and formalized an export-led growth 
model taking into account the cumulative causation principle developed earlier by 
Myrdal [Dixon-Thirlwall (1975)]. Further, Thirlwall presented a model explaining the 
importance of the Balance-of-Payments as a constraint to growth. The core idea is that 
balance-of-payments deficits (in current account) prevent the expansion of demand and 
consequently the growth of output. The necessary condition for higher output growth is 
that a country’s income elasticity of the demand of exports must be higher than that of 
imports. 
Thirlwall(1979), proposed a model which determines a country’s growth rate 
consistent with the Balance-of-Payments equilibrium. In this model the demand 
function of imports is positively related to national income and negatively to relative 
prices of imports, and the demand for exports function is positively related to foreign 
income and inversely to relative prices of exports. The import and export demand 
functions, taking variables in growth rates, are the following:  
      ()   t t t t πy px e pm ψ m + − + =      import demand function             (1) 
      () t t t t t εz e pm px η x + − − =            export demand function                               (2) 
where  t ma n d t x  are the rates of growth of real imports and exports, respectively, 
t pm and  t px are import and export prices growth rates, respectively, e is the exchange 
rate variation,  t y  is the rate of growth of real domestic output,  t z  is world income 
growth rate, ψ  is the price elasticity of the demand for imports, π  is income elasticity 
of the demand for imports, η is the price elasticity of the demand of exports and ε  the 
income elasticity of the demand of exports. 
The Balance-of-Payments equilibrium on current account (variables in growth 
rates) requires: 
                                                 
1 Verdoorn Law relates the growth of  productivity to the growth of output assuming that productivity 
is endogenous in the growth process. This dynamic relationship captures the technical properties of 
the production function, namely, the economies to scale characteristics, Verdoorn(1949).   14
    e m p x p m x + + = +                                                                   (3) 
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into (3), we can derive the domestic income growth 
rate consistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium, given by: 
   
) )( 1 (
π
ε ψ η z e p p m x
BP y
+ − − + + =                                           (4) 
where BP y  is the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate for a given economy. 
The above expression reveals some well-known economic implications, such as, the 
Marshall-Lerner condition for successful devaluation (|η+ψ|>1), the dependence of 
domestic income on the strength of foreign demand (z) and the inverse impact on 
domestic income of a high import penetration (π). This relation also captures the effects 
of price and non-price competitiveness depicted in the price and income elasticities, 
respectively.    
       Based on a rather realistic assumption that in the long run the terms of trade remain 
constant, (рx  -  рm  – e = 0), the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth condition 
reduces to:  
         
π
εz
BP y =                                                                               (5) 
  or                π
x
BP y =        since x =εz                                                      (6) 
Expression (6) is the well-known Thirlwall´s Law, which states that the growth of real 
output can be predicted by the growth of real exports divided by the income elasticity of 
the demand for imports. This rule is equivalent to the Harrod foreign trade multiplier 
when it is expressed in a dynamic form
2. Thirlwall´s Law, equation (6), can be 
expressed in a different way giving some additional information on relative growth 






BP                                                                                      (7) 
Equation (7) states that a country’s growth rate relative to the world is given by the ratio 
of its income elasticity of the demand of exports to that for imports. In other words, a 
country will grow faster than the rest of the world, yBP>z, if its income elasticity of the 
demand of exports is higher than its income elasticity of the demand for imports, ε>π. 
As a policy recommendation for higher growth this model suggests the reallocation of 
                                                 
2 Thirlwall (1982) shows this equivalence.   15
resources towards the production of tradable goods with high elasticity of demand in 
international markets.  
 
Export-led growth evidence from Portugal, Greece and Ireland 
 
The next step is to test the validity of Thirlwall´s Law considering the set of our 
studying case economies, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. We first need to estimate the 
import and export demand functions for the three economies, to derive the price and 
income elasticities. An error correction specification of the Engle-Granger two-step 
approach was used to capture short run dynamics and avoid dynamic misspecification. 


























∆ + ∆ = ∆ 1 - t res   log log   log θ η ε ,                Export demand function      (9) 
In these equations M is the volume of imports, X is the volume of exports, Y is real 
domestic income (GDP at constant prices index), Z is real foreign income (GDP at 
constant prices of the OECD countries), Pm is import price index and Px the export price 
index. In the same equations π  and ε  are the dynamic short run import and export 
elasticities with respect to national income and foreign income, respectively, ψ and η  
are the dynamic short run price elasticities with respect to relative prices of imports and 
exports, respectively, δ and θ are the error correction coefficients, res are the residuals 
obtained from the estimation of the cointegration equation, ∆ is the lag operator of the 
first differences in logs to express variables in growth rates, and vt and wt are the 
stochastic disturbances. The source of the data is OECD
3 covering the period 1970-
2001. Table 4 reports the results obtained from the estimation of the demand functions 
of imports and exports for Portugal, Greece and Ireland. A dummy variable was 
introduced in the OLS estimation for Portugal and Greece in order to capture the effects 
of integration in the EEC, Greece in 1981 and Portugal in 1986. A dummy variable was 
not used for Ireland since this country became member of the EEC in 1973, almost in 
the beginning of our time series data set.  
 
                                                 
3 Statistical Compendium, 2003   16
TABLE 4. ESTIMATION OF THE IMPORT AND EXPORT DEMAND FUNCTIONS FOR PORTUGAL,  
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Greece_______________________________________________________________               
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notes: t-ratio in parenthesis; *- statistical significant at 5%; **- statistical significant at 10% 
 
The estimated results are quite satisfactory except for the export equation for Ireland
4. 
The estimated income elasticities are all positive as expected and statistically 
significant. The same happens with the estimated import price elasticities. In the 
estimation of export demand functions, the price elasticity is only statistically 
significant for Portugal but it carries a wrong sign. Price elasticities are negative and 
                                                 
4 We believe that the poor performance of the export demand function in Ireland is due to failure in 
capturing the qualitative characteristics of exports related to technology, innovation, efficiency, 
productivity, flexibility of labour market, etc.   17
lower than unity in most cases, as expected. Income elasticities are positive and higher 
than one, showing that imports and exports are very sensitive (income elastic) with 
respect to income variations. In the three countries the income elasticity of the demand 
of exports is higher than the income elasticity of the demand for imports showing that 
all countries can grow faster without facing constraints on demand. The error correction 
effect is relatively weak (especially in the export functions) indicating a slow rate of 
adjustment of imports and exports to their equilibrium levels. 
        Comparing the three countries, Portugal reports the lowest export income elasticity 
and Ireland the highest. On the other hand, the Greek income elasticity of the demand 
for imports is the highest, and the Irish the lowest. According to Thirlwall´s rule, Ireland 
is in a higher advantage to grow faster without incurring balance of payments problems.     
        The empirical analysis proceeds further to test the validity of Thirlwall`s Law by 
using the necessary information of the foreign trade elasticities and other relevant 
variables. The results are reported in Tables 5a and 5b for different specifications of 
Thirlwall´s rule.  
      
Table 5a – Thirlwall´s Model (yBP =ε*z/π) 
1970-2001  ε  z  π  yBP=ε*z/π ya  ya-yBP 
Portugal 2,12  2,92% 1,80 3,45% 3,51% 0,07%
Greece 2,47  2,92% 1,91 3,76% 2,58% -1,19%
Ireland 2,85  2,92% 1,66 5,01% 5,19% 0,18%
 
 
Table 5b – Thirlwall´s Law (yBP =x/π)
 
1970-2001 x  π  yBP = x/π  ya  ya-yBP 
Portugal 5,69%  1,80 3,16% 3,51% 0,35%
Greece 7,30%  1,91 3,81% 2,58% -1,23%
Ireland 10,11%  1,66 6,09% 5,19% -0,89%
Notes: 
ε - income elasticity of demand for exports, z – average annual growth rate of real GDP of the 
OECD countries,  π − income elasticity of demand for imports  ,  yBP  – Balance-of-Payments 
equilibrium growth rate, ya – average annual growth rate of GDP of the respective country, and x – 
average annual growth rate of real exports. 
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According to Table 5a, equation yBP =ε*z/π seems to predict better the growth rates of 
domestic output in Portugal and Ireland than in Greece. The accuracy of equation 
yBP=ε*z/π  is specially satisfactory in the Portuguese case, as the difference between the 
actual growth rate (ya) and that predicted by Thirlwall´s Law (yBP) is extremely small for 
the whole period (1970-2001). Both Portugal and Ireland show that the estimated 
Balance-of-Payments equilibrium growth rate (yBP) is lower than the actual growth rate 
(ya), implying that both countries grew slightly faster than the balance of payments 
condition allows. The gap between the predicted and the actual growth rate in Greece is 
higher than 1%. The fact that the predicted output growth rate is higher than the actual 
rate indicates that Greece has all the potential to grow faster without confronting any 
demand constraints. On the contrary, Portugal and Ireland compromise a farther 
expansion of their economic activity. 
Table 5b reports the results of the alternative specification of Thirlwall´s Law 
given by the equation, yBP=x/π, which also predicts closely the actual growth of real 
output with higher accuracy in the case of Portugal. However, the picture for Ireland is 
different. Using the growth of real exports (x) instead of the estimated value (ε*z), we 
observe that Ireland could grow slightly faster than actually happened because of higher 
growth in exports. This is the main advantage of Ireland relative to Greece and Portugal, 
explaining the higher growth records of the Irish economy, combined also with the 
lower income elasticity of its demand for imports.   
If we look at the estimated income elasticities, the Irish superiority is obvious. 
Ireland has the highest income elasticity of exports (2.85) and the lowest income 
elasticity for imports (1.66) relatively to other two countries. This reveals that the 
products which are produced in this country are more competitive not only in the 
domestic market but also in international markets. According to our evidence, the Greek 
economy has shown a higher growth capacity relatively to Portugal, since the predicted 
growth rate in Greece is higher than in Portugal. Once more, the explanation of output 
growth differentials can be found on export growth differentials. Greek exports show a 
higher penetration in the world market, as its income elasticity of the demand of exports 
is higher relatively to Portugal. On the other hand, Portugal seems to benefit from a 
lower income elasticity of the demand for imports relatively to Greece. 
It is interesting to use the same methodology to predict growth rates for a more 
recent period (1981-2001) where Ireland registered higher rates of economic activity   19
converging rapidly to the EU economic average levels. Tables 6a and 6b present all the 
information needed for such new prediction. As we can see Thirwall´s equations predict 
fairly well the growth rates of domestic output in the three countries (especially in 
Portugal) for the more recent period, 1980-2001. In Portugal and Ireland, the estimated 
Balance-of-Payments equilibrium growth rates are higher than the actual rates, 
indicating that both countries had the potentiality to grow slightly faster than actually 
did. Once more, the Irish higher growth performance is explained by its higher income 
elasticity of the demand of exports and lower income elasticity of its demand for import 
or the higher growth of exports (Table 6b). 
 
Table 6a –Thirlwall`s  Model (yBP =ε*z/π) 
1981-2001  ε  Z  π  yBP=ε*z/π ya  ya-yBP 
Portugal  2,54 2,71% 2,26 3,06% 3,00% -0,05%
Ireland  3,80 2,71% 1,78 5,77% 5,51% -0,26%
Greece  1,53 2,71% 2,63 1,58% 1,79% 0,21%
 
Table 6b - Thirlwall`s  Law  (yBP =x/π)
 
1981-2001 x  π  yBP = x/π  ya  ya-yBP 
Portugal  6,96% 2,26 3,08% 3,00% -0,08%
Ireland  11,95% 1,78 6,70% 5,51% -1,18%
Greece  3,98% 2,63 1,51% 1,79% 0,27%
Notes: 
ε - income elasticity of demand for exports, z – average annual growth rate of real GDP of the OECD 
countries, x – average annual growth rate of real exports, π- income elasticity of demand for imports, yBP 
– Balance-of-Payments equilibrium growth rate, ya - average annual growth rate of GDP of the respective 
country 
 
Differences in income elasticities between imports and exports, and export growth 
capacity also explain the poor growth performance of the Greek economy. Income 
elasticity for imports (2.63) is much higher than income elasticity of exports (1.53) 
predicting a slower average growth in output of only 1.79% per year. The low rates of 
export growth (4% per annum) contribute significantly to the slowdown of economic 
activity in Greece.  
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5.  Long-run dependence between each country and the EU 
 
An important issue also to study is how the economic performance of each country is 
influenced by the EU behaviour as a whole. In order to test this hypothesis of 
dependence between the individual country and the EU, we relate income per capita or 
productivity of each country to the EU average and the familiar ARDL specification is 
used to estimate error correction models
5. This approach allows us to distinguish the 
short-run and long-run externality effects of the EU to each country, by estimating the 
co-integration equations. 
          The long-run relationship between each individual country and the EU is given by 
the following simple equation: 
                                   t i t EU t i u by a y , , , + + = , 
where yi is per capita income or productivity of the individual country (in log), yEU is 
the EU average of per capita income or productivity (in log), t is time and u a white 
noise error term.  
 
 Per capita income dependence 
 
The equation of per capita income between each country and the EU average is 
estimated and the results are reported in Table 7. The regressions are shown to be quite 
satisfactory for Portugal and Greece but not for Ireland. From Table 7 we observe that 
all the estimated coefficients of the short-run and long-run effects for Portugal and 
Greece are statistically significant at the conventional levels. The long-run per capita 
income elasticity of Portugal with respect to the EU average is higher (greater than one). 
The externality effects of the EU economic performance in per capita income are 
smaller in the case of Greece. If EU per capita income increases by 1% this induces 
1.3% increase in Portugal and only 0.54% in Greece, in terms of the same variable. The 
error correction term is significant in the two equations but the adjustment process is 
somewhat faster in Portugal. This confirms our previous observation that Portugal 
adapted faster to the integration rules than Greece. Finally, it was not possible to find 
any statistical significance between Ireland and the EU in terms of per capita income 
revealing that the links between the two are not strong. 
                                                 
5 The details for the specification and estimation of Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models can be found 
in Greene(1997).   21
TABLE  7.  LONG-RUN PER CAPITA INCOME DEPENDENCE BETWEEN EACH INDIVIDUAL                       
COUNTRY AND THE EU, 1970-2001. 
  
Portugal-EU       
 
           .6304 13   stat.   -   F     1.7614,   W     , 73473 . 0 R     ,   8035 . 0 R
ARDL(4,2)                     6849 . 3 3328 . 1
(-3.83)                    (-2.50)                   
4922 . 0 94961 . 0                  
                
   (4.37)                     (2.4987)                       (-2.21)                      (4.28)     (-3.79)                  
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3328 . 1 6849 . 3
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,t EU POR y y + =  
      
Greece-EU                      
 
2.466   stat.   -   F     1.312,   W     , 098 . 0 R     ,   16477 . 0 R
ARDL(1,0)                     2481 . 4 5326 . 0
             (-1.95)                 (2.21)        (1.51)                  
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Long-run relationship             
       (4.89)        (4.0)              
5326 . 0 2481 . 4
* *
,t EU GRE y y + =  
 
Ireland-EU                       
.9916 6   stat.    -   F     1.5289,   W     , 30739 . 0 R      , 3587 . 0 R
ARDL(1,0)           3459 . 31 2934 . 4
    (-0.54)               (1.28)      (-1.98)                   




= = = =
+ − =





t t EU t IRL
 
 
Long-run relationship        
      (0.91)         (-0.71)               
2934 . 4 3459 . 31 ,t EU IRL y y + − =  
Notes: ARDL – Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model, ecm- error correction term, t-ratio in parenthesis; 
*- statistical significant at 5%, **- statistical significant at 10%, ***- statistical significant at 15% 
 
 
Productivity dependence  
 
The same procedure can be used to test for any plausible relationship between each 
country and the EU in terms of productivity. Productivity is defined as output per unit 
of effective labour (the ratio of real GDP to total employment). The short-run and long-
run relations of GDP per worker between the individual countries and the EU average    22
TABLE  8.  SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN  PRODUCTIVITY  DEPENDENCE  BETWEEN  EACH                        
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY AND THE EU.  
Portugal-EU (1974-2001)      
           .7385 4   stat.   -   F     1.6612,   W     , 43478 . 0 R     ,   58223 . 0 R
ARDL(1,4)                     8161 . 3 3078 . 1
(-2.59)                   (3.42)                   
36939 . 0 5291 . 1                
    
  (1.03)                      (-1.23)                  (1.26)       (-2.46)                    
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Long-run relationship   
       (3.96)   14.67)   (             
3078 . 1 8161 . 3
* *
,t EU POR y y + =  
      
Greece-EU (1977-2001)        
.8897 7 stat.   -   F      1.7966,   DW       , 40792 . 0 R       , 46713 . 0 R
ARDL(1,0)           31840 . 0 0087 . 1
(-1.98)                  (3.60)            (-0.01)                    




= = = =
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Long-run relationship             
    (3.10)     (-0.01)             
0087 . 1 31840 . 0
*
,t EU GRE y y + − =  
 
Ireland -EU(1970-2001)     
5.9160 stat.   -   F     2.1274,   DW      , 26694 . 0 R      , 32124 . 0 R
ARDL(1,0)           4196 . 9 883 . 1
(-3.44)              (3.42)       (-3.36)                   




= = = =
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− ∆ + − = ∆ −
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Long-run relationship             
    (42.85)      (-20.1)             
883 . 1 4196 . 9
* *
,t EU IRL y y + − =  
 
Notes: ARDL – Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model, ecm- error correction term, the lag structure is 
decided according to SBC criteria, t-ratio in parenthesis; *- statistical significant at 5%, **- statistical 
significant at 10% 
 
are exposed in Table 8.  All these elasticities are statistically significant, indicating 
substantial externality effects on productivity emanating from the EU. However, Ireland 
is more productivity elastic than Portugal and Greece. Both short and long run 
productivity elasticities are higher in Ireland than in the other countries. A 1% increase 
in productivity in the EU causes 1.9% increase in productivity in Ireland but only 1.3% 
in Portugal and even less in Greece (1%). This shows that Ireland absorbs in a more   23
efficient way the spill-over effects of the gains in productivity all over the EU, and 
converges faster than Portugal and Greece in terms of this variable. 
 
  6. Summarizing the main conclusions  
 
In this study an attempt has been made to shed light to three main issues: first, to 
identify the driving forces of economic growth in Ireland, Greece and Portugal; second, 
to explain the remarkable recovery of the Irish economy since the nineties, the 
reasonable economic performance of Greece in the late nineties and the modest or 
negative performance of Portugal in recent years; and third, to show the lessons that 
Portugal can derive from that positive experience in Ireland and Greece.  
The evidence from the comparative analysis and especially in terms of per capita 
or per worker incomes shows that the gap between Ireland and both Portugal and 
Greece has become wider, particularly during the nineties. Ireland seems to have 
accumulated a set of advantages in comparison to Portugal and Greece in many areas. 
At the beginning of the sixties the levels of development in the three countries were 
considerably below the European average, but by the end of the nineties the Irish 
economy has made a remarkable economic recovery, catching up with the richest 
economies of the EU.  Portugal and Greece were not able to recover to the same extent 
as Ireland, despite the fact that both of them have shown a modest convergence towards 
the EU standards. 
According to our analysis, the main source explaining the growth of per capita 
income was labour productivity in the three countries. However, productivity gains 
were much higher in Ireland and even in Greece than in Portugal. For many authors, the 
higher productivity growth in Ireland can be explained by higher human and 
technological capital accumulation. Ireland invested more in human and less in physical 
capital, in contrast to Portugal and Greece. The combination of higher-qualified human 
capital and a flexible labour market characterized by moderate increases in real wages 
were powerful attractions to foreign direct investment in high technology sectors, which 
have been a very important vehicle for technological diffusion. The Irish government 
also contributed to attract foreign direct investment towards some target sectors through 
fiscal benefits, persuading foreign enterprises to create clusters in sectors such as 
electronics, computers and pharmaceuticals. The production of small sized products and 
easily transported goods implies lower transportation costs. From the point of view of   24
the spatial economics this is an important element especially for a peripheral country 
like Ireland.  
The allocation of resources to sectors with higher productivity and the 
development of export-orientated activities can be the explanation for the higher growth 
rates achieved in Ireland. Thirlwall´s export-led approach confirms this evidence. It was 
found that Ireland can grow faster than Portugal and Greece without facing any 
constraint on demand. According to Thirlwall’s model Ireland has shown clear 
advantages since the seventies in comparison to Greece and Portugal. The products that 
produces are competitive both in domestic and international markets and this can be 
seen from the high elasticity of demand of exports relatively to the low elasticity of 
demand for imports. Comparing Portugal and Greece, Greek exports have revealed a 
higher penetration in the world market during the whole period (1970-2001), shown by 
a higher income elasticity of the demand of exports. This seems to be Greece’s main 
advantage over Portugal. On the other hand, Greek main disadvantage is its income 
import elasticity, the highest between the three countries.    
The relative economic success of Ireland in comparison to Portugal and Greece 
could be explained by a set of structural factors, such as, higher human and 
technological capital accumulation, higher labour productivity and higher export 
performance.  
The evidence also shows that the Portuguese and Greek economies are much more 
linked to the European Union than Ireland in terms of per capita income. In terms of 
productivity Ireland seems to benefit more from the EU performance and to converge 
faster.  
Higher qualifications of human resources, higher technological capital 
accumulation (innovation and R&D) and specialisation in high-tech activities with 
lower transportation costs are some of the lessons that Portugal can learn from the Irish 
experience. Irish labour productivity growth was due to its human capital accumulation. 
The high qualifications of its workforce attracted the kind of foreign direct investment 
that drives technological diffusion and economic growth. On the contrary, the higher 
rates of physical capital accumulation in Portugal failed to have the expected results on 
growth, since labour productivity remains the main structural problem of the Portuguese 
economy. To improve productivity, Portugal has to invest more in human resources and 
less in physical capital accumulation. More innovation and R&D are needed to improve 
the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy. The Irish economic success in the 90’s   25
was the result of the 60’s and 70’s policies on education, R&D and foreign investment 
attraction in high-tech activities with high elasticity of demand in international markets. 
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